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C2PA checker

Check Content Credentials on a JPEG or PNG. The reader shows the manifest, the claim generator, the signer name, the recorded actions and any trained-algorithmic-media assertion. The file is not uploaded. Signatures are not verified.

Updated 22 October 2026 · Check AI Free

Local Content Credentials reader

Read a C2PA manifest

Choose a JPEG or PNG. This page looks for a C2PA manifest store in JPEG APP11 segments and PNG caBX chunks. The file stays in your browser and is not uploaded. The signature, certificate chain and pixel binding are not checked.

No image selected

Up to 20 MB. WebP is accepted as a file, but this reader does not extract a WebP manifest. A screenshot is a different file and may not carry the source image’s credentials.

Both demos use the same original 1 × 1 PNG pixels. The first has invented fields and no signature; the second has no manifest. See the controlled comparison below. Neither demonstrates successful credential validation.

Same pixels, different Content Credentials readings

A readable manifest is not a verified credential. Our original synthetic PNG contains invented claims and one recorded action, with no signature. Removing only its manifest chunk leaves the same image pixels but changes what this reader finds.

Controlled unsigned PNG comparison · reader results
ObservationSynthetic manifestManifest-free copy
File size534 bytes69 bytes
Decoded image1 × 1 white pixel1 × 1 white pixel
Manifest claims read10
Reading resultmanifest_readabsent
Signature box readNoneNone
Signature verificationNot performedNot performed

The copy retains the PNG image data and every other chunk byte for byte. This is a controlled removal, not a test of a screenshot, editor or social platform. Neither file is a valid signed credential, and the missing store does not establish whether pixels came from a camera or a generator.

  1. Run each demo above to compare the actual reading states.
  2. Download each demo PNG and its JSON or Markdown reading report to repeat the check.
  3. Compare the file SHA-256 values in the reports. Different metadata produces different file hashes even when the decoded pixels are identical.

For signed claims, follow how to check Content Credentials and examine an independent validator’s signature, trust and asset-binding results.

What a Content Credentials check can show

C2PA is a way for a file to carry a manifest: a claim about how the asset was made, a list of assertions, and a signature over that claim. Content Credentials is the name people see in products that write those manifests. In a JPEG the manifest store is split across APP11 segments whose payload starts with the two bytes JP. In a PNG it is a caBX chunk. Inside that store, a manifest is a set of boxes. The claim is CBOR and can name a claim generator. The assertion store holds labeled records such as c2pa.actions and c2pa.ingredient. The signature box holds a COSE signature and, often, the signer’s certificate. This page walks that structure and prints the fields a person usually came to see.

The claim generator names the software that produced the claim, with any generator-info name and version stored beside it. The signer line is the common name and organization from the first certificate in the signature’s certificate chain, when that certificate can be parsed. Actions are the history the manifest recorded: created, edited, cropped, filtered, and the other names in the C2PA vocabulary. Each action can name a software agent and a digital source type. Ingredients are other assets the manifest says were used. Assertion labels are listed even when this reader has no special layout for that assertion.

How to read an AI assertion without overreading it

Look for a digital source type, not a product slogan. The reader recognizes exact supported IPTC source-type values in supported action or metadata fields, including trainedAlgorithmicMedia and composite types that name it. The result is a stored declaration about an AI-created or composite source, not a verified event or a measure of truth. A software name or a matching string elsewhere does not count as that field. The file in front of you may be an original output, an edited derivative, or a file that never had a manifest. The reader reports the file it was given.

A manifest can describe a camera photograph too. Do not collapse “Content Credentials present” into “AI.” The checker’s AI line stays quiet unless a supported source-type value is actually there. A missing manifest is also normal: the file may never have had one, or a later copy may not retain it. The controlled comparison above changes only the manifest storage. Our edition 1 metadata report instead measured XMP retention in specified local transforms, not C2PA signature validation or platform uploads. Treat a missing manifest as a property of this copy.

Two neighbouring tools answer neighbouring questions. The EXIF viewer reads camera and caption fields, which a manifest does not replace. The PNG info reader reads parameters and a ComfyUI workflow. Those are unsigned text chunks. A workflow JSON is not a Content Credential, and a Content Credential is not a prompt. If you want a general look at the pixels after the manifest is missing or inconclusive, use the image checker. That path can send a smaller copy to a provider. This checker does not.

Hard limits: 20 MB, a bounded number of boxes, assertions, actions and ingredients, and no attempt to reconstruct a manifest from a thumbnail or a screenshot. If a signature box is present but the certificate name cannot be read, the page says that, and it still does not claim the signature was verified. WebP, HEIC and other containers are out of scope even when a future file might carry a manifest some other way.

Questions

Does this C2PA checker verify the signature?

No. It reads the manifest store and shows the claim generator, signer name, actions and ingredients. It does not check the cryptographic signature, the certificate chain, or whether the manifest is bound to these pixels. A signer name is text from the embedded certificate.

Is the image uploaded?

No. JPEG APP11 segments and PNG caBX chunks are parsed in your browser. The file is not uploaded. Do not use this page as a way to send a private image to a validator.

What does an AI-generated assertion mean?

The reader looks for an IPTC digital source type such as trained algorithmic media, or a composite that names that type, inside the parsed assertions. When it is present, the manifest asserts that kind of source. The assertion can still be stripped, copied, or left unverified by this tool.

Why would a real photo have Content Credentials?

Cameras and editors can sign ordinary photographs. A manifest does not mean the picture is AI-generated. Look at the actions and the digital source type. Created with a camera source is a different statement from created with trained algorithmic media.

Which files can this page read?

JPEG manifests stored in APP11 segments marked JP, including a manifest split across several segments, and PNG manifests stored in a caBX chunk. WebP files are accepted and reported as outside that container. A screenshot is a different file and may not carry the source image’s credentials.

Sources

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